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The EC: A Hungarian View Toward 1992
Bela Kadar*
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of the Single European Market in 1992 is a serious chal-
lenge for Hungary, the pioneer of the Central and East European re-
newal process. This Article attempts to outline the major causes of
concern, the expected impacts, and some strategic responses for Hungary
as a Single European Market emerges.
II. REALrTms OF THE CHALLENGE
The establishment of a Single European Market is an historic mile-
stone in the development of Western Europe and the system of interna-
tional relations. The role of Western Europe in international relations
was drastically weakened by the two World Wars. After a short recon-
struction period, between 1950-1970, both Eastern and Western Europe
have lagged behind North-America and Japan on the road of technology-
intensive growth. From the European standpoint specialized sectors
have been evolving in international economic relations. Comparative ad-
vantages in the production of material-intensive and energy-intensive
products, in traditional light manufacturing and consumer durable goods
are moving into the developing countries, especially the Far East coun-
tries. Meanwhile the output and export of technology-intensive products
or future-oriented industries with significant financial flows are mainly
concentrated in the United States and Japan.
The radical halt of Europe's economic loss of ground and the laying
of the foundation of a European "risorgimento" opening up new hori-
zons, are developments of world-wide dimensions. Undoubtedly, the
pace of economic growth, structural transformation, and technical and
scientific progress will be accelerated by the abolition of differing ap-
proaches to the system, the general harmonization of the social and eco-
nomic environment and policies, and the large scale replacement of
previous bureaucratic management techniques with the regional integra-
tion of market forces. These changes will effect the conditions of eco-
nomic activity in approximately forty percent of the European
Communities' ("EC") combined Gross Domestic Product ("GDP").
* Minister, Ministry of International Economic Relations, Republic of Hungary.
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Economists are well aware of the fact that the process of European
integration is not exempt from contradictions and conflicts. There will
obviously be disagreement among the Members States of the EC con-
cerning the financing of costs stemming from the integration process,
economic reallocation, and the sectoral and geographical reorientation of
economic activities. In fact, it is possible that due to implementation
problems resulting from conflicting interests, the establishment of the
Single European Market will require more time and bear less favorable
results than expected, in terms of growth, employment, and equilibrium.
The formation of a "European Europe" will also mobilize political
interests and forces. These forces will be necessary to respond to the
Asian challenge. Furthermore, they are needed to counter the weak-
nesses of a century-old Atlantic system of relations resulting from the
dominant Pacific economic orientation of the United States and to cure,
once and for all, the Euro-sclerosis of the 1970s.
The establishment of a unified internal economic environment in the
EC will be a reality in the 1990s. This unification will result in a con-
sumer population of 320 million, representing fifty percent of world trade
in services, forty percent of world merchandise trade, and twenty-five
percent of world production. This formation of a more pronounced mar-
ket force, in the context of Western European integration, demands an
immediate adjustment from all trade-sensitive foreign countries in the
world.
III. THE EC CHALLENGE AND HUNGARY
The EC Challenge is a special part of the multiple "shock effects"
influencing Hungary. In the last decade a structural equilibrium in the
economic, social, and political crisis has emerged. This complex crisis
was a multi-causal one. The driving forces encouraging rapid growth in
the three decades after World War II have been exhausted. These forces
included survival after the war and the life-energy releasing effect of
''zero-time."
In the 1950s and 1960s these forces included the resources
redeployed into the productive sphere through expropriations, income-
nivellation and the negligence of agricultural and infrastructural develop-
ment; in the 1970s growing indebtedness. As far as the 1980s are con-
cerned, a number of factors have already had a powerful and negative
effect including missing the opportunity to adjust to the new type, tech-
nology-intensive world economic growth pattern and the new world eco-
nomic value system, handling the consequences of indebtedness, and the
"Eastern Challenge" resulting from the exhaustion of the driving forces
in CMEA cooperation. For example, the share of CMEA countries in
Hungary's foreign trade decreased from seventy-one percent in 1960 to
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forty-five percent in 1988 and it will probably be down to forty percent in
1990.' The model-functioning disorders, missing the world economic ad-
justment, structural obsolescence, and loss of market positions could be
perceived prior to the 1992 challenge.
Prior to World War II the development level of Hungary was
roughly similar to the Southern European countries. By 1985, per capita
GDP based on purchasing power parity calculations was 11% higher in
Italy, 48% higher in Spain, and 8% higher in Portugal.2 The Hungarian
share of world exports amounted to 0.65% in 1938 and 0.4% in 1988.3
The physical isolation of Hungary from the Western-European infras-
tructural developments is especially severe in road and communication
networks. Thus, the difficulties resulting from the simultaneous eco-
nomic and political hardships of external economic reorientation and im-
provement of performances, are multiplied by the challenge of 1992.
The external conditions of the social and economic progress in Cen-
tral European countries are favorably influenced by the dynamic devel-
opments and accelerated modernization of neighboring Western Europe.
Western Europe is a region which has played a decisive role in the histor-
ical development of Hungary in the last one thousand years. These de-
velopments are illustrated by the apparent curing of "Euro-sclerosis" in
the 1970s, by the deregulation and liberalization of the economic envi-
ronment and, finally, by the standardization of adjustment requirements.
With the advent of the unification of the 1992 program, Hungary will be
in a better position to modify its social and economic progress since the
adjustment of traditionally weak Hungarian enterprises to the national
markets of twelve countries is, by all considerations, a bigger task than
having to adjust to a unified market.
At the same time, however, a new challenge will be introduced in
Hungary involving a number of new shock effects in the form of in-
creased sales competition in Western Europe, the extended scope of com-
petition mechanisms, stronger trade-diverting and capital-draining
effects, and the squeezing of non-competitive, outside countries and en-
terprises from Western European markets creating a more unified eco-
nomic, technical, and administrative system. This danger is not
hypothetical since it is reflected in the development of East-West rela-
tions in the second half of the 1980s. It is even more instructive to realize
that so far the geographical enlargement and the "articulation of depth"
of the EC has unfavorably influenced the industrial exports of less com-
petitive CMEA countries at a higher rate. The 1988-89 Annual Report
1 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF HUNGARY.
2 UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF GDP IN EUROPE (1988).
3 UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
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of ECE4 also highlights the fact that between 1980 and 1986 the supply
of sources in industrial imports of EC countries shifted from Eastern Eu-
rope to South European countries. In a broader perspective, Central and
Eastern European countries are unfavorably influenced by the geographi-
cal reorientation of Western European economic forces. If Western Eu-
ropean economic dynamics are centered along the Hamburg-Sevilla axis
instead of the Danube basin and the Alp-Adriatic zone, the external con-
ditions of the development of Central European countries will further
deteriorate.
The establishment of the unified internal market and a more solid
foundation of the joint actions of Western European countries tends to
increase the bargaining power of Western Europe in international rela-
tions. In a period of a decreasing trend, or low level of danger, arising
from military conflicts, international power relations are primarily influ-
enced by the size of international economic, and more precisely, finan-
cial, technical and foreign trading bargaining power. As a consequence
of the more intensive interactions between the military, economic, and
social aspects of security, the importance of the EC security policy in
relying on greater bargaining power is indirectly increased even if the
"European" character of assuming a military and security role is not de-
veloped until the mid-1990s.
The appearance of united Western European defense and political
efforts could hinder the improvement of relations with outside countries
and, parallel with the unification of the economic environment, draw a
new line of demarcation between the countries separated from each other
after Yalta. The risks stemming from the diverging priorities of a unified
market and an all-European cooperation are far from being eliminated.
It is also difficult, from the domestic politics viewpoint to prepare the
individual Central European countries for strategic re-integration with-
out the anxieties around "Fortress Europe" being clearly dismantled.
Furthermore, the unfavorable possibility of Austria entering the EC and
the deterioration of the special relationship between Austria and Hun-
gary might pose a problem of primary importance to Hungary.
IV. HUNGARIAN OPTIONS
Based on Hungary's history of development, continental situation,
and present growth endowments, economic growth has been deeply em-
bedded in the European division of labor. Only one-sixth of her foreign
trade is with non-European countries. Therefore, the Hungarian exter-
nal economic strategy is anxious to expand cooperation with overseas
developed and outside developing countries. Nevertheless, these overseas
4 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE 64-82 (1989).
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partners cannot counterbalance the consequences of deterioration of the
European division of labor.
Hungarian policy makers, in line with the general attitudes in East-
ern Europe, ignored the development challenges coming from Western
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The power group interested in the pres-
ervation of the political and economic structures created after World
War II strove to intensify cooperation among CMEA countries. The ex-
haustion of the earlier driving forces of CMEA cooperation and the
widening sphere of the regional shortages made the futility of these at-
tempts obvious by the eighties. The recent political collapse of the old
system in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia made
the realization of the idea of an "East European fortification" formed by
chariot-countries hopeless.
A specific offshoot of regional protectionism is an all-European co-
operation growing out of a CMEA-level response, that is, of the relations
between the two regional organizations. These approaches lead into
blind alleys, partly as a consequence of the dishevelled system of CMEA
cooperation and partly due to the different interest relations and counter-
vailing possibilities by countries vis-A-vis the European Communities.
Therefore, the scope of regional cooperation is very limited at the outset.
For example, the Hungarian economy has distanced itself in the last two
decades from the Soviet-type Stalinist model and is advancing, on the
basis of her national characteristics, on the road of development termed
as "market economy Hungarian style." A similar pattern will be fol-
lowed in Poland and, with different timelags, in the various other Central
and Eastern European countries.
The responses to the EC challenge and the character of relations
between the EC and the individual CMEA countries will also reflect na-
tional characteristics and thus, be selective. Even the pace, depth, and
complexity of the transformation taking place in the individual reform-
countries shows considerable differences which makes either the modern-
ization of economic cooperation between CMEA countries or the joint
response hardly viable.
While the framework of traditional CMEA cooperation is not suita-
ble for intensifying established relations with the EC, a new situation
emerges because the transformation unfolding in Hungary and Poland is
spreading over to East Germany and Czechoslovakia and because there
is a possibility of postponement of Austria's entry into the EC. Although
the Central European CMEA countries following the road of transfor-
mation are trying to improve their positions in the "circles of Western
Europe," individually, their advancement toward the inner circles of the
EC system of cooperation will take place in several stages, through a
longer period of time. The concept for Pan-European Economic Integra-
1990]
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tion seems to finding increasing acceptance.5 It has been contended that
the Central-European reform countries, similar to the remainder of the
EFTA, might cooperate more intensively with each other and the EC
through interweaving mirkets without having to participate in the Euro-
pean political collaboration.
The transitional period can be improved by a Central European sub-
regional system of cooperation which would link together, with differing
intensities, the Central European countries involved the Western Euro-
pean circles of cooperation. At the moment the most rapidly assembled
"core" of Central European cooperation could be an Austrian-Hun-
garian-Yugoslavian subregional relation. These relations can be continu-
ously expanded, depending on the success of the transformation process
in other Member States. As far as Hungary is concerned, Central Euro-
pean cooperation is not an exclusive alternative vis-i-vis EC relations
since the joint share of Austria and Yugoslavia in Hungary's foreign
trade in 1988 represented ten percent, and the figure for East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland amounted to fifteen percent. At the same
time it could mitigate the external economic risks of transformation and
strengthen Hungary's bridge-building role in East-West relations.
As a consequence of all these factors in external relations, the EC-
connection is a matter of life and death from the point of view of Hun-
garian development. It is not a coincidence that among all the CMEA
economies both the relative increase and the absolute share of the twelve
EC countries was the highest in Hungary's trade in the two decades after
the beginning of the Hungarian economic reform. Between 1970 and
1988 the EC share in Hungarian exports rose from 16% in both 1970 and
1985 to 24% in 1988. In Hungarian imports, the figure rose from 17%
in 1970 to 21.8% in 1985 and 25.3% in 1988.6
The EC countries import more than half of Hungary's timber and
furniture exports and 31-43% of her food, raw material, leather, and
clothing exports. The further development of Hungarian-EC relations is
of decisive importance from the viewpoint of several production sectors.
The Hungarian export product structure into the EC countries is more
favorable than into the average of developed market economies as a
whole.
Material intensity of Hungarian exports is focusing on the expansion
of materials into neighboring countries, including those in the EC, be-
cause of transport cost efficiency. The opening of the Danube-Rhine-
Main Waterway reduces the logistical disadvantages of Hungarian ex-
5 Schmieding, Between Perestroika and "Internal market, 1992", in KIEL WORKING PAPERS
(No. 370 1990).
6 YEARBOOK OF THE HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL OFFICE.
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ports and makes it possible to transport Hungarian goods to more distant
regions of the EC.
The establishment of the Single European Market, the standardiza-
tion of certain fields, and the simplification of the licensing and registra-
tion procedures can improve the market access possibilities of
pharmaceuticals which represented 2.5% of all Hungarian exports to the
EC, in 1987. In the high-tech fields, and in those with high technological
development intensity, the standardization of technical norms influences
all Hungarian imports. In 1987, the EC share was 40% of total Hun-
garian instrument imports, 27% in machines and equipment, within
these 44% of metal producing machines, 37% of office machines, 32-
33% of special industrial machines and electric machines and
equipment.7
The technical norms and standards of the Common Market will
probably be adapted by a great number of "outside" countries depending
on EC relations, therefore these norms and standards can be regarded as
de facto Western European ones. As a result, the import dependence is
more considerable in view of the relations with non-EC Western Euro-
pean countries. Although in 1987 the Common Market represented
7.5% in total Hungarian machine and equipment exports, export expan-
sion to Western Europe presupposes the adaption of the new norms and
standards. As a consequence of the narrowing markets of the Hungarian
machine industry, specialized in CMEA markets, one of the require-
ments of the necessary market re-allocation is the adjustment in the field
of standards.
In the case of heavy chemicals (which represented 10% of Hun-
garian exports to the EC in 1987, specified mostly by standardized pa-
rameters, containing homogenous semi-processed products) the norms
and standards were established earlier, the chances for standardization
are relatively modest, and their impact on the Hungarian economy will
be small. Light industrial consumer articles such as cosmetics are ex-
pected to change less radically, due to the greater national resistance
within the EC regarding unification.
The impact of coordinating and standardizing technical norms
reaches beyond the EC to the whole of Western Europe. For dimen-
sional reasons the outstanding role of the Common Market and the
Western European region as a whole in the Hungarian reproduction pro-
cess, makes it expedient and desirable that Hungary join the standards of
the EC. The share of overseas OECD countries and that of the new
industrial exporting countries tends to increase the external orientation
of the Hungarian economy. Due to dimensional reasons the cooperation
with the more dynamic new partners cannot countervail the shrinking
7 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF HUNGARY.
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tendencies in CMEA cooperation. The relative importance of trade with
the EC countries is almost twice as great as other average CMEA econo-
mies which indicates the high EC-sensitivity of the Hungarian economy
and the interrelation of Hungarian economic reforms and the Europeani-
zation of her national economy. The basic task of Hungarian external
economic strategy is no to take a defensive attitude vis-i-vis the chal-
lenges of 1992 but, instead, to exploit the possibilities of the bigger inter-
nal market by an active, offensive strategy of renewal.
V. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS OF HUNGARIAN-EC RELATIONS
Prior to the rapid transitions in Central and Eastern Europe the re-
ceptiveness of the EC was not reassuring from the viewpoint of Hun-
garian cooperation efforts. These efforts are interpreted in the
complexities of the European processes. There is an increasing interna-
tional recognition that the failure of "perestroika" could lead to an open
crisis in Central and Eastern Europe and the inability of present and
future political forces to guarantee a peaceful transition and to protect a
basic Soviet interest which might increase the danger of conflict situa-
tions and provoke a crack-down by the armed forces. A soft-landing of
the transition in Central and Eastern Europe is a basic international and
regional security interest. There is a strong correlation between dimin-
ishing confrontation dangers and military utilization of resources. If
Eastern Europe succeeds in redeploying resources in the civilian sphere,
the crisis situation, and confrontation danger, will simultaneously de-
crease. To launch and speed up this process with international resources
seems to be an international interest and can lead to the transformation
and erosion of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
European support of perestroika might generate new regional driv-
ing forces. Central and Eastern Europe has a bride-gift as well: the
favorable endowment with cheap and relatively skilled labor. The coun-
tries, enterprises, and enterprise-coalitions will acquire a competitive
edge from the input side if they rely on this human resource potential.
The successful combination of Central European skilled labor, semi-
product and spare-part producing capabilities with Western technologies,
management, and market organization can create alternative input-
sources to the competition of the Asian countries. In addition, it might
decrease the international financial and commercial imbalances. An ex-
tension of the united Europe toward the East might also improve the
chances of Europe in the international competition.
The demarcation line between the two halves of Europe has changed
frequently during its history. At present, a new milestone is represented
by the efforts of Central Europe to reconsider the consequences of Yalta
and reintegrate into the European and world economy. These endeavors,
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as the events of 1956, 1968 and 1980 indicate, cannot be derived from
Soviet perestroika. Nor can their success be exclusively linked to its fu-
ture. There is no doubt that the success of perestroika is a fundamental
national, regional, and international interest. It is not probable, however,
that an inward-looking Soviet-Union emerging after an eventual failure
of perestroika would strive to return to its previous presence and com-
mitments if the Central European countries respect the geopolitical reali-
ties and did not endanger Soviet security and economic interests. The
economic substance of a united Europe can first be extended to Central
Europe and the pioneer countries of transition. This aspect makes the
reconsideration of the previous motivations of the European policy and
the creation of its Central European dimension more convenient.
On the basis of geographical boundaries and traditions of coopera-
tion the European re-integration of the Hungarian economy cannot be
indifferent for countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and
Italy. It is in the interest of Western Europe to take responsibility in the
transformation of Hungary and Central Europe and facilitate a non-vio-
lent Central European transformation. This transformation would in-
lude an increase in the value of Central and Eastern European regions in
the EC's geographical priority hierarchy by offering better market access
possibilities, encouraging the flow of technologies and direct capital, by
structural cooperation reaching beyond transportation and environmen-
tal protection, by opening the "gates" of organizations which Western
European countries participate in such as the OECD, Council of Europe,
and European Parliament, and by establishing European integration be-
tween enterprises, small communities, and different population groups.
The other, equally important external "pillar" of Hungarian Eu-
rope-policy is the new Soviet strategic and foreign political initiatives, the
easing of tensions in the field of Soviet-American military confrontation,
and the possibility of withdrawing foreign troops stationed in Europe.
The new European policy of the Soviet Union, including the tolerant atti-
tude toward Hungary's attempts to resolve the crisis create external con-
ditions for the formation of new, more articulate ways of cooperation
between Hungary and Western European countries. At the same time, a
scientifically-based European policy in Hungary must not ignore the con-
sequences of cyclical political processes and of a possible transitional So-
viet restoration. Flowing from this, in the period of favorable external
conditions, the more rapid pace of institutionalizing relations between
Hungary and the EC is of key importance because this may offer contrac-
tual safeguards to the irreversibility of this process.
VI. HUNGARIAN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO THE EC
Confronting external conditions and Hungarian endeavors also calls
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attention to the necessity of implementation of these changes in stages.
For the forces and interest groups in the center, and right from the
center, of the Hungarian political sphere, obtaining the full EC member-
ship for Hungary, the most intensive contractual and institutional partic-
ipation in the Western European integration, is a strategic goal. From
the viewpoint of reinforcing the European identity of Hungary and
strengthening the process of democratization, setting this strategic goal is
of decisive importance. However, the existing Hungarian external links
hardly make it possible to take on the obligations stemming from the
Single European Act approved in 1986, since they are not compatible
with a possible later status of neutrality. The time requirements and un-
foreseeable developments of European re-organization and wide-scale
constructive all-European cooperation and demilitarization following the
normalization, necessitate the preparation of "stage type" intensification
of relations and an openness to the new forms of cooperation resulting
from these new developments.
In the present situation the accelerated implementation and further
conceptual development of the Trade and Economic Agreement, signed
in the autumn of 1988 between Hungary and EC, reflects an earlier stage
of the political situation, justified by the accelerated transformation pro-
cess and new political developments. It would be desirable to develop
the trade agreement between Hungary and the EC into a more compre-
hensive cooperation in the fields of economic, technology, financial, and
tariff policies. An asymmetrical free trade agreement between Hungary
and the EC would ease the adaptation burdens of Hungary in the most
critical period of transition and would make it possible for industrial and
agricultural preferences given by the EC to be reciprocated after a certain
period of grace.
The new Hungarian and Central European situation, unprecedented
in the history of the external relations of the EC, and the more powerful
expansion of the coalition government formed after the elections could
make it worthwhile for the EC to accelerate the intensification of rela-
tions. This opening of relations could be made by offering a "special
status" reaching beyond the scope of the free trade agreement. This spe-
cial status in the "circles of Europe" is not incompatible with either the
Callaghanite idea of a unified European economic cooperation zone or
with that of Central European subregional cooperation.
The internal conditions of responding to the EC challenge do not
significantly differ from the general requirements of the Hungarian re-
newal process. The requirements of adjustment to the Western Europe
of the 1990s should become manifest in all segments of the new Hun-
garian development strategy. These segments range from external eco-
nomic strategy to structural and educational policies, legislation,
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standardization, environmental protection, and the modernization of the
institutional structure.
On the governmental level, adjustment is expected from the imple-
mentation of a comprehensive integration package. External relation-
building will focus on the blending of the European dimension of the new
Hungarian foreign policy, security policy, trade policy - facilitating
market access of Hungarian agricultural products, - decreasing the
tariff burdens of Hungarian industrial goods, obtaining the full-scale
treatment of most favored nation status, a complex cooperation policy
reaching beyond the trade agreement and, finally, the combined scien-
tific, educational, and cultural policy must be a high priority.
Regarding structural policy, it is well-known in the scientific com-
munity that in the last fifteen to twenty years the material, energy, capi-
tal, and intensive production and supply structure of Hungary has not
generated dynamics, income, or stability, in the domestic economy or in
hard currency exports.
The creation of more up-to-date forms of cooperation and the accel-
eration of European re-integration requires a powerful redeployment of
resources, incomes, and economic activities. For instance, the simplifica-
tion of the registration procedures and licensing of pharmaceuticals, fol-
lowed by better access to markets makes it both expedient and desirable
to concentrate on the development of the Hungarian pharmaceutical in-
dustry and related sectors such as biotechnology, the production of pesti-
cides and insecticides and veterinary medicine.
Furthermore, it is necessary to reallocate a growing proportion of
resources into the sector having greater technical development intensity
such as manufacturing sectors, production of electric engineering con-
sumer articles, telecommunication, vacuum techniques, computer pro-gramming, and instrument industry, to be prepared for the requirement
of the Single European Market. It would be expedient to focus the initial
stages of commodity and capital import liberalization on those sectors
which bring the fastest results.
Beyond the transitional protection of the scope of activities, which
will reach a competitive level only after a certain transitional period, the
future of lastingly non-viable sectors and activities, and those not relying
on specialization advantages, must be identified to countervail import
competition. The further structural development and new-type export-
orientation of Hungarian agriculture and food industry, having, by Euro-
pean standards, exceptionally favorable growth endowments, could be
linked to a significant increase of the share of some import products from
the EC including fodder, butter, milk powder, and mediterranean fruits.
In order to prevent greater social, political, sectoral, and regional ten-
sions, the future of those Hungarian sectors and activities, which will be
phased out as an aftermath of cooperation with the EC, must be deter-
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mined in the framework of comprehensive cutback and restructuring
plans.
The main field of Hungarian economic re-integration into Europe is
the sphere of enterprise activities. A fundamental task of government
activities is to establish an economic environment and management tech-
nique which compels and makes Hungarian enterprises interested in per-
forming successfully in Western European markets. In addition, it must
create the preconditions of enterprise-level competitiveness by abolishing
the barriers of capital, manpower, and technology and revise the present
overtaxation practice, offering attractive conditions to foreign investors
and other partners by adjustment to the Western European measures of
deregulation and standardization. In this context Hungary intends, after
a preparatory period, to move in the "European House" as one among
equal tenants and not as a night-lodger in the basement. Flowing from
this, European inter-enterprise relations will be a popular growth area
based on the Hungarian human resource potential, expertise, and techni-
cal developments mobilized through the European forms of cooperation
and the establishment of a network of Hungarian banks, financial institu-
tions and production and service enterprises.
VII. CONCLUSION
The creation of New Europe demands, parallel with preservation of
national identities and cultures, the integration at levels of European
population, the reinforcement of Europe-consciousness, and the estab-
lishment of behavioral cultures in harmony with the historically well-
proven values of Europeanism. This process can be accelerated by easing
the mobility of the Hungarian population around Europe in tourism, ed-
ucation, and jobs, and, in the framework of an all-European cooperation,
by the creation and rapid development of a network of Hungarian insti-
tutions affiliated and integrated into various European Academies, Euro-
pean Institutes and the whole European teaching and educational
system. Of course, Hungary's re-integration into Europe cannot be real-
ized without a larger-scale adjustment to the historically well-proven
Western European values of democracy, parlamentarianism, human
rights, private ownership, and a moral value system. It is of great impor-
tance to reflect on the European-level party political lines of force in the
Hungarian domestic political development and to make use of inter-party
relations in the new political field of force in the integration process.
The new European policy of Hungary and the accelerated adjust-
ment to the challenge of 1992 involves a number of breaking points re-
garding the institutional frameworks and power structures which have
come about in the last decades. Overcoming the various kinds of resist-
ance and moments of inertia resulting from these factors requires very
Vol. 22:269
1990] HUNGARIAN VIEW TOWARD 1992 281
circumspect, creative solutions bearing in mind the room for change in
the country and the possibility, with upcoming elections, of a newly-
formed, government capable of officially representing the national
interests.

